Dealing with culture Essay

It has already been mentioned earlier that for effective intelligence work there must be an ability to understand other people’s culture especially that of the enemy. But there is also another type of culture that must be addressed and understood – it is the culture that exists within the US intelligence community. It must be made clear though that no organization or community does not develop values or norms overnight. This only means that any initiator for change must be ready for the long haul because it will not away that easily. There is always organizational culture, it helps define the group and guides its members on the proper course of action. According to Amy Zegart the culture that exists within the intelligence community can be described as parochialism, risk aversion, resistance to change, and that â€Å"need to know trumps need to share† (2007, p. 64). All of these need to be transformed in order to have a much improved intelligence community. Coordination The 9/11 fiasco as seen in the nine-one-one report clearly calls for better coordination among the different counter-terror agencies of the US government. This realization leads to the recommendation that for America to be safer there is a great need for more coordination among the said groups. But as many have known this is easier said than done. According to Zegart the CIA from the onset was not really given the power to coordinate all government agencies related to intelligence gathering and as a result: The existence of so many separate agencies and the absence of formal mechanisms to integrate them became reinforced by bureaucratic procedures over time. Throughout the Cold War, different intelligence agencies developed their own budgets and set their own priorities, hired their own staffs and trained them in separate programs, communicated by separate e-mail systems and kept intelligence in incompatible databases (2007, p. 66). Jurisdiction is one of the major stumbling blocks in solving a crime or gathering data. When this term comes up immediately more barriers will shoot up immediately preventing the agency with a significant lead to pursue even further. Now, there is a good explanation for jurisdiction and it is the need for order, focus, and responsibility. But most of the time it only serves one thing and it is to be sure who to blame when there is a failure in the system. One of the painful realizations in 9/11 is the fact that terrorists do not respect jurisdiction, they come and go as they please and successfully exploited the civil liberties offered to individuals living in this country. So a member of a terror group can be living in Asia for one year and then at the end of that period decides to fly to Los Angeles and then from there move around the country in preparation for a major attack. Who then is in charge to track this guy? Sharing of Information Aside from the lack of coordination, another related problem is the strong dislike for information sharing. And again this is understandable; each group is rewarded for their effort. If one has caught a huge quantity of fish by being up all night on a fishing expedition there is no logic to sharing it with others who did not put up the same effort. On the other hand there are cases wherein the failure of one agency is the failure of all. Take for instance 9/11, there is no use shifting blame or pointing fingers at the CIA because the destruction is close to the heart of America where everyone is affected. This leads to the argument that information should not be the standard-operating-procedure but there are cases where information sharing is a must. And one way of doing this is by classifying cases, finding out which one requires the collaboration of those working internationally, on the national level or local level. Improvements The preceding pages clearly demonstrated that there is a need for positive change in the US Intelligence community. If civilians and those who are from the outside looking in can provide key observations on areas that needed change then those who are working within the intelligence community are painfully aware of their shortcomings. The following pages will describe the improvements made by various counter-terror groups within the fold of the Federal Government. Need to Share Information One of the areas that requires overhaul is with regards to information sharing. This has not been lost to the analysts and strategists working under the U. S. Department of Homeland Security and its think tank the Homeland Security Advisory Council who proposed the Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative: Homeland Security Intelligence and Information Fusion. The key term here is fusion and this program calls for the: †¦ managing of flow of information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government and the private sector to support the rapid identification of emerging terrorism-related threats and other circumstances requiring intervention by government and private-sector authorities. It is more than the one-time collection of law enforcement and/or terrorism-related intelligence information and it goes beyond establishing an intelligence center or creating a computer network (see Homeland Security Advisory Council). This relatively recent move by the DHS is not only audacious but shows how they have completely acknowledged the error of their ways. There is no single or central agency that can do all the work when it comes to apprehending terrorists. The lowly policeman may not be wearing fancy suits and may not even pull top dollar from his work but a police officer does the dirty work. The operatives of counter-terror groups may have the firepower and the resources apprehend a terror group but they can be far away; it will take them precious time to leave their offices in and pursue. Whereas the local police department is in close proximity to the terrorist cell and therefore there is no reason why they could not be dispatched to stop the said terror group from executing their plans. To get a better idea with regards to how serious DHS is in improving their capabilities, the anti-terror agency is not only acknowledging the need for sharing information and intelligence but they are also admitting that crucial data can come from anywhere. The DHS pointed out the sources of relevant information to be coming from: a) Federal; b) State; c) local; d) tribal; e) various government entities; f) General public; and g) Private-sector entities. Therefore, there is a great need to improve on the process of information analysis and information dissemination. The following steps are designed to jump-start the said process (see Homeland Security Advisory Council): †¢ The use of common terminology, definitions, and lexicon by all stakeholders; †¢ Identifying critical information repositories and establishing the process, protocols, procedures, and technical capabilities to extract information and/or intelligence from those repositories; †¢ Understanding and elimination of impediments to information collection and sharing (i. e. , it should be a priority for the Federal Government to provide State, local, and tribal entities unclassified terrorism-related information); †¢ Extensive and continuous interaction with the private sector and with the public at large. The FBI It was mentioned earlier that in the decades of the 70s and 80s the Federal Bureau of Investigation was forced to mellow down its tough investigative stance. The lack of aggressiveness was criticized in the aftermath of 9/11. Today new laws are giving new life to the FBI invigorating the said agency to pursue suspected terrorists. Aside from the new mandate – following 9/11 – that allow the FBI to step on the accelerator the President of the United States issued a new directive in 2005 that would forever transform the FBI. On June 28, 2005 the President directed the FBI to create the National Security Branch within the FBI that will result in, â€Å"Integrating investigative and intelligence activities against current and emerging national security threats†¦Ã¢â‚¬  (see National Security Branch Overview, 2006). This new mandate from the President allows for the creation of the following: a) the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division (CTD); b) the Counterintelligence Division (CD); c) the Directorate of Intelligence (DI); and d) the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD). This simply means that the FBI is no longer typecast as the main investigative body of Federal government it now also functions as counterintelligence and counterterrorism arm of the government as well as the main agency that will handle weapons of mass destruction in the domestic sphere. Conclusion The United States of America, its leaders and its citizens must come to terms with its new found status. And it is the sole superpower in the global arena. There is nothing that comes close to the US in terms of economic and military might. This is good news for those who come to enjoy the protection of a superpower – a protector who believes in democracy and the rule of law. But this is not a welcome thought for American citizens who are now perceived as enemies by those who have a sick worldview such as extremists. These fanatics are frighteningly angry at the US and their blabbering and crazed invectives show that they may not be coherent at times but are dead serious in causing harm. The US Army is capable pulverizing a small country into smithereens and even able to bring a powerful enemy nation to its knees e. g. Iraq but it does not have the moral authority to simply barge in and decimate suspected enemies. The Federal Government is therefore dependent on an effective and efficient intelligence gathering arm. It has been shown earlier that it is no longer possible to rely on one single agency to combat terrorism and therefore what is needed is coordination and information sharing. One of the major issues that was resolved was in dealing with a prevailing culture of fragmentation, parochialism, and the insistence of need to know versus sharing of information. After 9/11 it is easy to consider changing negative attitudes and adopting a new view on coordination and information sharing. Thus, after 9/11 the U. S. Department of Homeland Security was tasked to break down barriers as it has become painfully clear that the lack of coordination was the simple explanation as to why suspected terrorists were able to undergo flight training under the noses of Federal officials. Concrete steps are made to ensure information dissemination as well as the creation of structures and human resources that will be able to analyze data coming from different parts of the world. Aside from these the U. S. Intelligence community acknowledged the fact that everyone is involved including the State, local and even tribal entities. The big wigs from the Federal Government are also acknowledging the importance of local law enforcement agencies as a deterrent as well as the most effective and efficient aspect of the whole counter-terrorism apparatus of the US. A welcome development was the strengthening of the capabilities of the CIA and the FBI. Special mention is appropriate for the President’s directive to vastly improve the ability of the FBI not only as an investigative arm of the Federal Government but also as a counter-intelligence as well as counter-terrorism agency especially when it comes to weapons of mass destruction that could be potentially deployed in the homeland. All of these changes and improvements combined will greatly deter terrorist activity and would help in the speedy arrest as well as dismantling of terror cells before these groups can wreak havoc in the same magnitude as September 11, another day that will also live in infamy. References Carafano, J. & M. Sauter (2005). Homeland Security. New York: McGraw-Hill. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2006). National Security Branch Overview. Retrieved 07 February 2008 from http://www. fbi. gov/hq/nsb/whitepaper12-06/whitepaper. pdf. Ganor, B. (2005). The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide For Decision Makers. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Hulnick, A. 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